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As the pace of technology increases, so does the potential development of disruptive 
technology-related threats. However, by enacting proactive safety and security measures 
during the window of opportunity, a government can cost-effectively protect an 
unsuspecting and ill-prepared society before an emerging disruptive technology is widely 
adopted without stifling its future development.  
The basis for the threat mitigation approach described herein is to inject the 
protective measures into the innovation cycle prior to a technology being adopted by the 
early majority in Everett Rogers’s technology adoption cycle. This period of time (the 
window of opportunity) occurs when the GartnerGroup’s hype cycle’s trough of 
disillusionment aligns with Geoffrey Moore’s chasm.  
This thesis explores two possible courses of action for mitigating domestic 
security and safety threats once a new technology’s window of opportunity is identified. 
First, domestic law enforcement can use this information to mitigate future security and 
safety concerns. Second, the state could design a flexible regulatory framework around 
the window in order to provide innovators and producers of an emerging disruptive 
technology with information highlighting its potential for illicit appropriation.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Invention is a great disturber, and it is fair to say that the greatest general 
cause of change in our modern civilization is invention.1 
In 1937, the U.S. National Resources Committee Subcommittee on Technology 
published a report that focused on technological trends and national policy, which 
included the social implications of new inventions. It stated; “Most planning is not 
concerned with invention as such, but with the effects of inventions. These social effects 
come only after widespread use.”2 Despite this warning, from nearly 80 years ago, about 
this key attribute of how to address threats that stem from new inventions, the nation has 
been unable to develop and institute an effective mitigation process. This shortcoming 
did not occur because of limited resources or misunderstanding the innovation process; 
rather it occurred due to fear of inhibiting the development of new innovations. 
Inventors resist the introduction of more oversight during the development phase 
because they fear regulation will stifle the progress of their work. Because in most cases 
vulnerabilities cannot be identified until the new technology is adopted by a percentage 
of the population, there is a significant risk involved with permitting unrestricted 
technological innovation because it restricts protection efforts to only a reactive 
approach. Therefore, if neither the government nor the companies proliferating new 
technologies are working to mitigate security concerns—then who is? As Kenneth Abbott 
writes,  
We are in the midst of one of the greatest periods of scientific and 
technological innovation in human history. Yet each of these technologies 
                                                 
1 National Resources Committee, “Technological Trends and National Policy: Including the Social 
Implications of New Inventions,” Internet Archive, accessed May 5, 2014, https://archive.org/details 
/technologicaltre1937unitrich. 
2 National Resources Committee, “Technological Trends and National Policy.” To note, in the context 
of this report the term “invention” was used broadly to encompass both “invention” and “innovation.” In an 
effort to clarify the distinction between the two terms, this thesis has adopted Joseph Schumpeter’s 
definition of invention, “the initial development of a new idea,” and innovation, “the commercially 
successful application of an idea.” Luke Stewart, “The Impact of Regulation on Innovation in the United 
States: A Cross-Industry Literature Review,” commissioned paper for the Institute of Medicine Committee 
on Patient Safety and Health IT, 2010, 1, accessed February 9, 2014, http://www.iom.edu/~/media 
/Files/Report%20Files/2011/Health-IT/Commissioned-paper-Impact-of-Regulation-on-Innovation.pdf. 
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also carries the possibility of significant risks to health, safety and the 
environment. And each entails other potential impacts that raise broader 
social, economic and ethical concerns.3  
Practically every aspect of modern life results from advances made possible 
through innovation; as Nicolas Asford, Christine Ayers, and Robert Stone illustrate, 
“technological innovation is both a significant determinant of economic growth and 
important for reducing health, safety, and environmental hazards.”4 Thus, the nurturing 
of innovation remains of central concern to the nation’s government, which is why there 
has been a tendency to permit innovations to develop free from control or oversight.5 
This approach cannot continue unabated. Instead, the way forward must begin with an 
understanding of the symbiotic relationship that exists between a technology and the 
society that adopts it, or in other words, accepting technological determinism and social 
constructionism as truisms.6 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to answer whether it is possible to identify threats associated 
with emerging disruptive innovations before these technologies are widely adopted. If so, 
can some form of regulatory control be used in a cost-effective manner to mitigate 
security concerns without stifling future innovation? As innovators develop new 
technologies, their focus is more on design and function than possible security and safety 
implications. In many cases, vulnerabilities are not identified until the technology is 
already adopted by a large percentage of the population. This method of introducing new  
 
 
                                                 
3 The term “innovation” is used throughout this thesis to refer to the process of technology 
development. Gary Elvin Marchant, Kenneth W. Abbott, and Braden R. Allenby, ed. Innovative 
Governance Models for Emerging Technologies (Northampton, PA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013),1; 
Stewart, “The Impact of Regulation,” 1. 
4 Nicholas Ashford, Christine Ayers and Robert Stone, “Using Regulation to Change the Market for 
Innovation,” Harvard Environmental Law Review 9, no. 2 (1985): 419, http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/1555. 
5 Stewart, “The Impact of Regulation,” 1. 
6 Everett Rogers defines technological determinism as, “the belief that technology causes changes in 
society;” and, social constructivism as, “social factors shape a technology.” Everett Rogers, Diffusion of 
Innovations, 5th ed. (New York: Free Press, 2003), 167. 
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technologies restricts domestic law enforcement and governmental regulatory controls to 
a reactive, rather than proactive, role when a disruptive technology is used with illicit 
intentions. 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The preeminent concerns that the government and private sector face when 
attempting to identify possible future threats associated with emerging disruptive 
technologies (EDTs) is wasting limited time, money, and resources. While it is possible 
to imagine how any given emerging technology could be used illicitly, there is nothing 
that dictates it will ever be accepted by a large enough percentage of the population to 
become a meaningful threat. Therefore, before a government attempts to enact any safety 
or security measures it must first understand the intricacies of a technology’s 
development, diffusion, and adoption processes. Afterward, it will then be able to identify 
the most cost effective period of time to enact a course of action without inhibiting an 
emerging technology’s future progress. 
The first substantive chapter of this thesis (Chapter II) will establish how EDTs 
pose a threat to the future of American society. Next, Chapter III will provide an in-depth 
explanation of innovation and technology development concepts in order to frame the 
context of this paper’s more advanced arguments. In Chapter IV the author will 
demonstrate how, using the concepts explained in the preceding chapter, it is possible to 
identify a lull in an emerging technology’s innovation and adoption cycles - the “window 
of opportunity.”  
The final two chapters (Chapters V and VI) will outline two distinctly different 
approaches to taking advantage of the window of opportunity in order to mitigate the 
security and safety threats that EDTs may pose. Chapter V will demonstrate how 
understanding the dynamics of this window can be utilized by domestic law enforcement 
(through homeland security intelligence collection, analysis, and implementation efforts), 




how designing a flexible regulatory framework around the window would provide not 
only a cost effective method to mitigate technology related threats, but also be perceived 
as helpful for a technology’s future diffusion and adoption.  
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT 
In our haste to milk technology for immediate economic advantage, we 
have turned our environment into a physical and social tinderbox.7  
As the U.S. exited the Cold War, the nation’s security concerns were focused on 
the possibility of a “loose nuke” or a “dirty bomb.” These concerns stemmed from the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and its loss of control over its vast stockpile of nuclear 
weapons. Despite the lack of proof that any Soviet nuclear material has even been 
smuggled into the U.S., the military and domestic law enforcement agencies have created 
specialized units to deal with the possibility of this threat. As an additional proactive 
measure, the Posse Comitatus Act was amended to allow for an exception if there was 
ever such an attack on U.S. soil. So why does this type of coordination and response to 
the illicit appropriation of nuclear material not translate to emerging technology?  
The reason that the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threat 
has historically been treated differently than threats that stem from EDTs is twofold. 
First, the general perspective that the way to protect society from a new technology can 
be as simple as removing its power source; and two, there has not been a large enough 
attack using an EDT to cause widespread concern. However, because of the ubiquity that 
many technologies have reached in today’s society, unplugging from a diffused 
technology could separate society from a necessary critical infrastructure (i.e., it is no 
different than stating the water or power system can simply be turned off). As an 
example, many of the traditional U.S. critical infrastructures rely on supervisory control 
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to operate, and many of them are vulnerable to a 
cyber-attack.8  
In this connection, there are strong arguments to support both the threat that the 
cyber realm possess and that the threat is overblown and completely unrealistic. Most 
                                                 
7 Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 1970), 428–29. 
8 SCADA systems allow equipment to be controlled remotely. It is commonly used to control 
industrial equipment for the U.S.’ critical infrastructure networks. 
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likely, this debate over the cyber threat will continue until there is proof that a human 
being has been harmed as a direct result of a cyber-attack.  
In order to demonstrate the complexities involved with addressing technology-
related threats, this chapter will explore several different concepts. Specifically, it will 
investigate the historical concerns over the uninhibited development, diffusion, and 
adoption of technology, the difference between sustaining and disruptive technologies, 
the complexity of technology oversight, and the different ways that technology can be 
used to induce harm. Understanding the intricacies of these concepts is a necessary step 
toward developing an effective and practical threat mitigation plan.   
A. FUTURE SHOCK 
There are striking similarities between today’s concerns over innovation, and 
those raised by futurists in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The reason for this association 
is because many of the futurists concerns have been partially validated by the 
complications the nation has experienced from the proliferation of new technologies over 
the past few decades. Today, these concerns are not entirely focused on fear of the 
unknown with respect to how things will change; rather, the fear stems from how much 
things will change. Even though changes from the introduction of new technology are 
inevitable, the manner in which a society adapts to that change can be predicated on a 
multitude of factors.  
Schumpeter presents a linear societal and process-oriented approach to 
technological development, which outlines that a new innovation will go through three 
stages: the idea, its application, and its diffusion.9 Referred to as the “Schumpeterian 
trilogy,” this process establishes the basis of Alvin Toffler’s concept of future shock—
”the shattering stress and disorientation that we [those that diffuse a new innovation] 
induce in individuals by subjecting them to too much change in too short a time.”10 
Toffer claims that future shock will occur if an innovation passes through the three stages 
                                                 
9 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950). 
10 Paul Stoneman and Paul Diederen, “Technology Diffusion and Public Policy,” The Economic 
Journal 104, no. 425 (1994): 918, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2234987; Toffler, Future Shock, 2. 
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quicker than a society can acclimate to it, in other words, “it is the disease of change.”11 
The overall result is what Rogers calls disequilibrium, “when the rate of change is too 
rapid to permit the system to adjust.”12  
The pace at which new technologies are being integrated into everyday life is 
increasing at an exponential rate.13 Toffler uses the typewriter to emphasize this point. 
The first patent for a typewriter was issued in 1714, and it took a century and a half 
before the machines became widely commercially available.14 In contrast, Apple began 
the development of the first iPhone, called “Project Purple,” in 2004, and it only took 
three years for the device to become commercially available. “If it takes less time to bring 
a new idea to the marketplace, it also takes less time for it to sweep through the society,” 
observes Toffler.15  
If the rate of public adoption of an emerging technology exceeds the ability of the 
government or private sector to institute security measures, then the public may face 
unforeseen and unintended threats to its safety. Furthermore, if a new technology is 
intentionally appropriated from the task for which it was designed and instead used 
criminally, the security implications become even more complex and urgent. As Toffler 
emphasizes: 
It is undeniably true that we frequently apply new technology stupidly and 
selfishly. In our haste to milk technology for immediate economic 
advantage, we have turned our environment into a physical and social 
tinderbox. Our technological powers increase, but the side effects and 
potential hazards also escalate.16  
Compounding Toffler’s concern is that the threat potential increases exponentially when 
the emerging technology is disruptive, vice sustaining, in nature. 
                                                 
11 Toffler, Future Shock, 2. 
12 Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 471. 
13 Edward Tenner, Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences 
(New York: Knopf, 1996), ix–xi. 
14 Toffler, Future Shock, 27–8. 
15 Ibid., 28. 
16 Ibid., 429. 
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B. SUSTAINING VERSUS DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 
Across disciplines there is a differentiation between sustaining and disruptive 
technologies. Clayton Christensen stipulates that all sustaining technologies “improve the 
performance of established products, along the dimensions of performance that 
mainstream customers in major markets have historically valued,” (i.e., they improve 
established products in an established market in an expected linear manner).17 This 
category of technology can progress in either an “evolutionary” or “revolutionary” 
fashion. The primary difference between these two terms is the amount of change from 
one version to the next.  
In short, the progression of sustaining technologies is relatively predictable. After 
Apple released the iPhone 4, the next evolutionary release was the iPhone 4S. In contrast, 
the addition of a finger print scanner and 64-bit architecture to the iPhone 5S could be 
described as a revolutionary change from the iPhone 5. However, in the end despite all of 
the iterative changes to the iPhone, from its first generation to the most recent model, it is 
still a smartphone that allows an individual to make calls, text, browse the internet, and 
interact with third party applications. One of the benefits of sustaining technologies, as 
Jackie Fenn and Mark Raskio point out, is that many of these innovations, “are likely to 
result in longer deployment, longer learning cycles and a slower path to maturity,” 
because they “need to be adapted to a greater degree in order to fit into existing process, 
culture, or technological infrastructure.”18 
Conversely, “disruptive technologies…are disruptive because they subsequently 
can become fully performance-competitive within the mainstream market against 
established products,” argues Christensen.19 Once introduced, disruptive technologies, or 
“competence-destroying product discontinuities” (a comparable concept conceived by 
                                                 
17 Clayton Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to 
Fail (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997), xv, xxi; Clayton Christensen and Michael Overdorf, 
“Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change,” in Harvard Business Review on Innovation (Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press, 2001), 115. 
18 Jackie Fenn and Mark Raskino, Mastering the Hype Cycle: How to Choose the Right Innovation at 
the Right Time (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2008), 42. 
19 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, xxiii. 
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Tushman and Anderson), challenge traditional industry norms and often create entirely 
new markets, that is, they introduce an unexpected change for which industry is not 
prepared.20 In light of this distinction, disruptive technologies present a significantly 
more complex regulatory and security problem than their sustaining technology 
counterpart.  
A contemporary example of a how the introduction of a new technology can 
change an industry is 3D printers. There are several indicators as to why 3D printers 
represent a disruptive technology. To begin with, the producers of 3D printers are not the 
same companies that have historically led the home printer market (such as Brother, 
Lexmark, HP, etc.). Rather, fairly new companies have entered the market that do not 
produce the “classic” 2D printer and instead focus only on 3D printers (such as 
MakerBot, Botmill, 3D Systems, etc.). Second, the traditional use of a home printer—to 
print word or images on some type of paper—does not translate to 3D printers. Instead, 
3D printers are focused on reproducing or creating objects. Third, users of traditional 
printers are not able to directly translate their printer familiarity to 3D printers, and 
therefore these individuals will require additional training in order to operate this new 
technology. Fourth, while printing words or images on traditional home printers has the 
possibility to incite dissent and spread hate, they cannot physically cause harm to an 
individual (aside from inadvertent paper cut). 3D printers, however, allow individuals to 
effectively “print” a weapon (whether it be a gun, knife, or other dangerous object), and 
therefore present an entirely new security challenge that the traditional printer industry is 
wholly unaccustomed to addressing. This issue, as outlined by Christensen, is indicative 
of the lack of foresight into a developing a process to properly manage these concerns 
prior to the widespread introduction of a disruptive technology.21  
                                                 
20 Michael Tushman and Philip Anderson, “Technological Discontinuities and Organizational 
Environments,” Administrative Science Quarterly 31, no. 3 (1986): 441-44. doi: 10.2307/2392832; This 
concept was further expanded upon in: Michael Tushman and Charles O’Reilly, Winning Through 
Innovation: A Practical Guide to Leading Organizational Change and Renewal (Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1997); Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, xv. 
21 Christensen and Overdorf, “Meeting the Challenge of Disruptive Change,” 115. 
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C. MITIGATION OR PREVENTION? 
“It is simply impossible to predict with any useful degree of precision how 
disruptive products will be used or how large their markets will be,” admits 
Christensen.22 Due to this uncertainty, there is no one single solution to protecting society 
against the illicit appropriation of an emerging disruptive technology. Currently, each of 
the nation’s established industries employ a different type of regulatory oversight, and 
they all utilize different processes to protect against illicit appropriation. Therefore, each 
new technology that is developed will necessitate a different method of protection to 
ensure that the introduction of protective measures do not inadvertently inhibit the further 
development of the technology.  
The innovation process is fluid in nature, which means that it is not possible or 
even useful to try and constrain or confine its parameters. As emphasized in the 1978 
report on Technological Innovation: A Critical Review of Current Knowledge, 
“Exogenous elements such as human wants, social values, and the economic structure 
affect the nature and rate of innovation itself; for, like any creative endeavor, it arises 
from the interaction between individuals and the socio-cultural environment.”23 
Consequently, any effort to mitigate security concerns of a new technology must begin 
after it is developed and it begins to integrate with society. As illustrated by Toffler, 
“Controls over technology need not imply limitations on the freedom to conduct research. 
What is at issue is not discovery but diffusion, not invention but application.”24  
For example, the introduction of personal 3D printers into an individual’s home 
does not dictate how the device will be used. It poses no threat when it is sitting on a desk 
plugged into a computer—unless an individual turns it on, loads the “ink,” selects a 
computer-aided design (CAD) file of a firearm, and selects “print.” It is the human factor 
that creates the threat, not invention of the technology. As Jacques Ellul outlines, “There 
is unpredictability when in spite of every effort future events are obscure and one cannot 
                                                 
22 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 154. 
23 Patrick Kelly and Melvin Kranzberg, ed., Technological Innovation: A Critical Review of Current 
Knowledge (San Francisco: San Francisco Press, 1978), ix. 
24 Toffler, Future Shock, 441. 
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give the probable course of their development. This happens often. We fail to foresee 
because there are so many things that we have to foresee.”25  
Because it is not possible to accurately predict how or at what rate a new 
technology will diffuse through a society, how a society will adapt to the technology, or 
how a technology will develop once it is adopted, the intention of this thesis is to address 
how to mitigate the new capability that the emerging technology will introduce. In 
agreement with a collaborative report by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s 
(DTRA) Advanced Systems and Concepts Office and Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC) titled Revolutions in Science and Technology: Future Threats to U.S. 
National Security, the goal should be to “make oneself less uncomfortable” when dealing 
with future threats from technology, because “problems do not stand still until ‘solutions’ 
can be contrived.”26 In a similar fashion, Bertrand de Jouvenel introduced the term 
futuribles, whereby one would focus on objectives instead of simply assessing what is 
most probable.27 This approach takes into consideration what could happen if we do not 
get involved and then it looks at what is our desired outcome. Effectively, the futurible 
concept attempts to walk the line between what is probable and what is most desirable. 
For example, the intended use of a cell phone is to call another person, but during 
Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom cell phones were used as detonators for 
improvised explosive devices. There was no expectation that the cell phone industry 
could have foreseen this illicit appropriation of its technology and instituted some sort of 
stringent distribution regulations. Instead, the industry, as well as society, should have 
given some consideration to whether or not the diffusion of cheap, disposable, and 
untraceable long distance transmission devices could be illicitly appropriated, and if 
there was a way to mitigate this appropriation, before they were introduced. 
                                                 
25 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Bluff (Grand Rapids (Mich.): W.B. Eerdmans, 1990), 82. 
26 Dallas Boyd et al., Revolutions in Science and Technology: Future Threats to U.S. National 
Security, ASCO 2011-014, Washington, DC: Defense Threat Reduction Agency, accessed February 10, 
2014, 104, http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=706488. 
27 Ellul, The Technological Bluff, 80. 
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D. THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY 
Technology is neutral; it is unable to dictate whether it is used in a positive or 
negative manner.28 The reason that a designer of new technology cannot entirely foresee 
the various uses of his or her invention is that “the lone genius in a lab or garage is an 
inventor, not an innovator—the invention needs to be socialized, adopted, and adapted in 
order to deliver value,” contends Jackie Fenn and Mark Raskino.29 Simply, in order to 
see the threat a technology poses, it must be used. The three categories of how the use of 
an EDT could pose a threat are dual-use, illicit use, and illicit appropriation. 
1. Dual-Use 
For the purposes of this thesis, dual-use is defined as a technology that has both a 
civilian and military application. For instance, GPS can be used to help an individual find 
his or her way around an unfamiliar city, and it can be used to guide precision munitions 
to their targets. Jonathan Tucker posits that the risks from dual-use technologies stem 
from “harm” and “misuse.” He defines harm as “an inherent characteristic of a dual-use 
technology or material,” which “encompasses a broad range of negative consequences, 
including fatal and nonfatal casualties, permanent disability, psychological trauma, social 
disruption, economic damage, and the incitement of fear.”30 Misuse, on the other hand, 
“is an action that violates an existing national or international statute.”31 While any 
technology can be misused (the most basic example is that a hammer can either be used 
to drive nails into wood in construction or as a weapon to inflict harm), the real concerns 
with misuse of a dual-use technology are those that “offer a significant qualitative or 
quantitative increase in destructive capacity over what is currently available.”32 
                                                 
28 Eduardo Calvillo Gámez and Rodrigo Nieto-Goméz, “The Case of ‘Illicit Appropriation’ in the Use 
of Technology,” in Technology for Facilitating Humanity and Combating Social Deviations: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, eds. Miguel Martin Vargas, Miguel A. Garcia-Ruiz, and Arthur Edwards ( 
Hershey, PA: Information Science Reference, 2011), 211. 
29 Fenn and Raskino, Mastering the Hype Cycle, 38. 
30 Jonathan Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and Security: Managing the Risks of Emerging Biological 
and Chemical Technologies (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2012), 10. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and Security, 3. 
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Even with these risks, the development of dual-use technology will (and rightfully 
should) continue to rise. Companies choose to pursue dual-use technologies because it is 
a fiscally rational course of action, and the reality is that the potential benefits that could 
stem from their development may very well outweigh the risks. One of the reasons that it 
is beneficial for a company to develop a dual-use technology is because the company will 
then have the opportunity to sell the end product to two types of consumers: military and 
civilian. With the potential to have twice the customer base, it is in a company’s best 
fiscal interest to develop a dual-use technology. On the other hand, innovative companies 
face a growing “dual-use dilemma.” Whereby, any attempt to mitigate risks associated 
with the potential misuse of a dual-use technology could adversely impact the 
development, and subsequent beneficial applications, of the new innovation by 
constraining the parameters of the technology’s development or adoption.33  
2. Illicit Use 
In this thesis, illicit use of technology is defined as employing a technology in the 
manner in which it was designed, but for illegal purposes. A straightforward example of 
this would be the use of a firearm in the commission of a crime. Even though a firearm is 
designed for the purpose of inflicting harm and companies who produce and develop 
them cannot prevent an individual from using it in a criminal act, they do not endorse this 
type of usage. Similarly, a more widely debated example of illicit use stems from the 
diffusion of document scanners. Historically, if an individual were to write a book, the 
only manner of duplicating it without the copyrighter’s consent would be through 
reproducing the physical book in its entirety—a tediously long and laborious process. 
 However, since the advent of document scanners, the book can now easily and 
efficiently be reproduced and then freely distributed in digital form without permission of 
the copyright holder. While those who invented these scanners recognized that one 
possible use of the technology is for an individual to replicate pages out of a book, they 
did not intend for the scanners to be used to violate copyright laws. Thus, the illicit use 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 1. 
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and subsequent widespread diffusion of this technology has over time adversely effected 
the publishing industry as a whole. 
3. Illicit Appropriation 
For the purpose of this thesis, illicit appropriation of a technology is defined as 
using a technology for an activity that is outside the parameters of its intended use and 
not allowed by law. A historical example is the Brighton Hotel bombing on October 12, 
1984, where the Provisional Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) attempted to assassinate 
Margaret Thatcher at the Conservative Party’s Annual Conference meeting. One month 
before the explosion, Patrick Magee, the bomb maker, placed Semtex in Room 629 and 
used a VCR as a timer for the bomb. By using a VCR timer as a long-day fuse, Magee 
was not only able to circumvent current security measures that were used to protect the 
Conservative Party, but he was also able to leave the country before his bomb detonated. 
As noted by Maria Rasmussen and Mohammed Hafez’s workshop report on Terrorist 
Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive 
Indicators, “this attack entailed taking an old and tried tactic—use of explosives—and 
combined it with something new and original—’the most popular entertainment 
innovation of the 1980s, the home video recorder.’”34  
It is safe to assume that the inventor of the video tape recorder (predecessor to the 
VCR), Charles Ginsburg, never intended for his technology to be used as a timer for a 
bomb.35 The potential for such illicit appropriation of the technology came about as the 
VCR became more widespread. As Alan Dix points out,  
improvisations and adaptations around technology are not a sign of failure, 
things the designer forgot, but show that the technology has been 
                                                 
34 Maria Rasmussen and Mohammad Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: 
Preconditions, Causes and Predictive Indicators, ASCO 2010-019, Washington, DC: Defense Threat 
Reduction Agency, accessed February 10, 2014, http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/Research 
/2010%20019%20Terrorist%20Innovations%20in%20WME.pdf. 
35 Encyclopædia Britannica, s.v. “videocassette recorder,” accessed July 15, 2014, http://www 
.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/627937/videocassette-recorder; “Inventor of the Week,” Lemelson-MIT, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, last modified January 2002, http://web.mit.edu/invent/iow 
/ginsburg.html. 
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domesticated, that the users understand and are comfortable enough with 
the technology to use it in their own ways.36  
The concern, of course, is users adapting the technology in a harmful way.  
Rasmussen and Hafez note in their study of terrorists’ use of innovations that 
terrorists will use any means necessary to reach their intended target, and they will seek 
out new innovations that may help them achieve their goal.37 Particularly in light of the 
terroristic or criminal potential of new technologies, Toffler insists that those who 
develop new technologies also are responsible for keeping it safe.38 However, the reason 
that it is unrealistic to expect that companies will make an effort to minimize 
misappropriation of their technology is because there are no incentives for them to do so. 
 In reality, there tends to only be disincentives. In order for a company to 
thoroughly evaluate a new technology prior to its release, it would not only have to 
lengthen its research and development phase, but it would also incur additional expenses. 
Furthermore, if it did identify the potential for illicit appropriation that rests at the core of 
their technology the company risks invalidating a significant portion of the work it has 
already done and could ultimately lose its funding. Therefore, it is much easier and less 
fiscally demanding for a company to simply release a product and then, if necessary, 
make the necessary changes in subsequent versions of their technology. As Howard Segal 
noted in his book Future Imperfect: The Mixed Blessings of Technology in America, the 
development of technology is being done by a “new generation” motivated purely by 
profit with only an allegiance to big corporations.39 
E. CONCLUSION 
Sustaining and disruptive technologies introduce different diffusion and adoption 
concerns, “not only are the market applications for disruptive technologies unknown at 
                                                 
36 Alan Dix, “Designing for Appropriation,” Proceedings of the BCS HCI 2007 Conference, People 
and Computers XXI (London, UK: BCS-eWik), 1. http://www.hcibook.com/alan/papers/HCI2007 
-appropriation/.  
37 Rasmussen and Hafez, Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect. 
38 Toffler, Future Shock, 431–40. 
39 Howard Segal, Future Imperfect: The Mixed Blessings of Technology in America (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), 165. 
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the time of their development, they are unknowable.”40 Consequently, it is not possible to 
develop a singular approach that will mitigate risks associated with both types of 
technologies. Additionally, the enforcement of any new regulatory policies should remain 
as a last resort because they could inadvertently impact the innovation process in a 
negative way. Despite Ellul’s belief that trusting inventors to not market a dangerous 
product is a viable method of reducing threats, all too often a technology’s “harmful 
effects are inseparable from its beneficial effects.”41 Thus, in order to set a realistic goal, 
any safety or security based regulatory process must be the mitigation—not prevention—
of threats from emerging technologies. 
While dual-use concerns are different from those associated with the illicit 
appropriation of an emerging technology, they can provide a basis for understanding the 
complexity of future threats. For example, historically a barrier that prevented many 
individuals from illicitly using a dual-use technology was the need for advanced 
education or specialized training.42 However, because of increased usability, automation, 
and collaboration this obstacle is no longer a practical prevention method for a 
technology related threat. In a similar fashion, an individual’s capacity to illicitly 
appropriate an emerging technology tends to only be limited by their imagination. 
Without implementing an effective method of addressing the root of the threat that is 
enabled by technology, rather than the technology itself, the American public may 
continue to face new and more severe safety and security threats.  
 
                                                 
40 Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma, 143. 
41 Ellul, The Technological Bluff, 39, 73, 75 and 99; Toffler, Future Shock, 441. 
42 Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and Security, 70. 
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III. TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT, DIFFUSION, AND 
ADOPTION 
If we wish technology to contribute to the achievement of our national 
goals and objectives, we must obtain a clearer understanding of that 
complex and significant activity known as the innovation process.43  
The issue with today’s proliferated technologies is that many of them “are nothing 
other than backbones designed to support spontaneous innovation. Millions of people 
potentially empowered by these backbone technologies mean millions of potential 
innovators all thinking and doing things that have not been thought or done before,” 
asserts Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez.44 In the established industry environment, there are 
procedures in place to oversee the development and testing of new technology before it is 
released to the public. The introduction of regulatory agencies like the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), etc. 
were a response to a need to protect the general public from being misled and/or harmed, 
and to develop and enforce a set of industry standards. In other words, these agencies act 
as a “filter” between the technology and society ensuring consumer protection and 
creating a fair trade environment. 
However, EDTs present a significantly greater threat because they are not 
associated with a specific industry, and therefore have no defined “filter” for a 
technology to pass through before it is released to the public. Instead, the tendency has 
been to wait until the technology causes harm before an effort is made to start the lengthy 
process of instituting some form of oversight. This reactive approach unnecessarily puts 
the public at risk each time a new technology is introduced into an unregulated 
environment.  
                                                 
43 Kelly and Kranzberg, Technological Innovation, iii. 
44 Rodrigo Nieto-Goméz, “Preventing the Next 9/10 The Homeland Security Challenges of 
Technological Evolution and Convergence in the Next Ten Years.” Homeland Security Affairs 7, (2011), 2, 
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Take for example the internet. The internet was originally intended to provide an 
efficient method for researchers to share their work, but it quickly grew into a vast 
network of any- and everything digital. During the advent of the internet in the 1960s, 
when it was known as ARPAnet, a worldwide interconnected network of computers was 
only a theory. However, after years of development and with support from the National 
Science Foundation in the 1980s, this network began to resemble the modern-day 
internet, albeit with one major institutional distinction: it was not available for 
commercial use. At this point, access to the technology was restricted to mostly the 
government and universities.  
As the use of the internet was expanding, so was the prevalence of its 
vulnerabilities, which prompted Congress to pass the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in 
1986. Shortly after this legislation, in 1988, the Morris Worm was released and became 
the first major virus to infect the network. Acting like an internal denial-of-service attack, 
the worm slowed down computers to the point they were unusable. In less than three 
days, it had infected approximately five percent of the computers attached to the 
internet.45 This attack was a clear indication of how this emerging technology was 
susceptible to illicit appropriation, and a contributing factor to the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) creating the Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT) later that same year. The important aspect of this timeline is that it all occurred 
prior to the 1990s when the internet was finally commercialized. 
Similar to the proliferation of all other critical infrastructures, the internet has 
been built for usability, efficiency, and cost effectiveness—not security—even though its 
architects and champions acknowledged, before its commercialization, the existence of 
significant threats to the security of the network. With all its known vulnerabilities—
including most recently the Heartbleed Bug—the internet continues to function as a 
crucial part of all U.S. critical infrastructure networks.46 Today, individuals, 
governments, and public and private businesses are using it on a daily basis for 
                                                 
45 Peter Denning, “The Science of Computing: The Internet Worm,” American Scientist 77, no. 2 
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46 Hannah Kuchler, “‘Heartbleed bug’ Threatens Web Traffic,” Financial Times, April 9, 2014, 
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everything from a primary method of communication to operating SCADA systems. Due 
to this ubiquity, the internet has become a disruptive technology that is “too big to fail.”  
This section will provide an in-depth explanation on technology development, 
diffusion, and adoption related concepts. The purpose is to provide the necessary 
background information needed to conceptualize how to identify a period of time where 
regulatory control can be injected in a cost effective manner without inhibiting an 
innovation’s future growth.  
A. TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION PACE AND PROCESS 
Technological innovation is a driving force behind the prosperity of the U.S. 
economy and its citizens’ well-being.47 Whether the product of publically and privately 
funded research and development (R&D) facilities or brainchild of the home inventor, 
innovation development, according to Rodgers, has six stages: recognizing a problem or 
need; basic and applied research; development; commercialization; diffusion and 
adoption; and consequences.48 While the progression through the stages may be linear, 
the process is often non-directional, and each innovation can spend a different amount of 
time in each phase. In other words, if a problem is found during the consequences phase, 
the inventor can enter or re-enter the process at any stage to rectify it. Even though an 
innovation advances through defined stages, the process is rarely considered logical or 
orderly. As Geoffrey Moore writes, “[I]nnovations often need considerable 
experimentation and development, along with patience and tenacity, before they deliver 
anything worthwhile.”49 Therefore, it is very difficult to reliably assess the future success 
or failure of emerging technologies during the early stages of their development with any 
expectation of accuracy.  
Especially in the case of disruptive technologies, the cost of developing a new 
technology often tends to outweigh its immediate benefits. A contemporary example is 
                                                 
47 Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity 
in a Time of Brilliant Technologies (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014), 72–3; Kelly and 
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48 Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 137–57. 
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 20 
the Navy’s efforts to develop F/A-18 Hornets that use alternative jet fuel made from 
algae.50 The Navy paid up to $150 per gallon for the algae-based fuel, at a time when 
conventional jet fuel only cost $2.88 a gallon.51 The difference in the two prices owes to 
the cost of development; however, if the new fuel becomes ubiquitous the cost per gallon 
will decrease dramatically as the production process is refined.  
The success of alternative fuel, along with many other innovations, tends to be 
directly linked to the pace of its development and, ultimately, its rate of adoption. Many 
prominent innovation scholars, including Everett Rogers and Alvin Toffler, agree that the 
pace of technological innovation is increasing at an exponential rate.52 Take, for example, 
the $35 million-dollar Cray-2 supercomputer that was unveiled in 1985 and Apple’s $499 
iPad 2 tablet computer that was released in 2011. While both of these computers boast 
identical calculation speeds, the iPad was not only portable, but it also included a slew of 
additional technologies, including “a GPS receiver, digital compass, accelerometer, 
gyroscope, and light sensor.”53 A major factor in this escalation in innovation is the 
availability of rapid experimentation sources and methods, which have become readily 
accessible to inventors. Through the use of refined, standardized, and modernized 
resources, inventors are able to reduce the cost of failures inherent in the innovation 
process. Specifically, the use of “computer simulation, rapid prototyping, and 
combinatorial chemistry” allows an increased number of inventors to get more out of 
their sometimes limited resources and funding.54 No less a figure than Thomas Edison 
believed that “rapid and frequent experimentation” leads to “great innovation.”  
                                                 
50 The F/A-18 Hornet is the Navy’s carrier-based multi-role fighter aircraft capable of air-to-air and 
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While some academics—for example, Stefan Thomke—focus on the physical 
attributes that enable rapid innovation (computer simulation, rapid prototyping, and 
combinatorial chemistry), Rogers and Toffler centered their work on investigating how 
innovations propagate through a society and the effects this diffusion has on the 
populace.55 What this scholar and futurist ultimately concluded was that even if there is a 
recognizable structure to the diffusion of an emerging innovation, the process may still 
yield unexpected results.56  
Take, for example, the progression of smaller and more powerful cellphones. 
While this technology progressed over the years in a relatively controlled and predictable 
fashion, it has caused a cultural shift among innovators and consumers. Originally, 
cellphones were used only as a method of wireless voice communication between two 
parties, but today most individuals rarely use them to make phone calls. This 
evolutionary shift is so widespread that cellphone development companies’ 
advertisements seldom promote call quality as a selling point for their products. As Elting 
Morison describes in his book, Me, Machines, and Modern Times, the current focus in 
innovation development is on continually trying to attain new and better capabilities, 
rather than attempting to get the most out of the technology that already exists.57 While 
this approach may be financially beneficial to an inventor it continually introduces 
unfamiliar and unrefined technologies into society.  
Technological change has brought about a dramatic increase in not only the rate 
of development of new innovations, but also society’s rate of adoption.58 The preeminent 
concerns that the government and private sector face when attempting to identify possible 
future threats associated with EDTs is wasting limited time, money, and resources. While 
it is theoretically possible to imagine how any given emerging technology could be used 
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in an illicit manner, there is nothing that dictates that type of use will ever be accepted by 
a large enough percentage of the population to become a meaningful threat. Therefore, 
the effectiveness of an EDT threat assessment hinges on an in-depth understanding of the 
technology adoption process.  
B. TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION CYCLE 
Supported by his observations and a review of empirical research, Rogers 
identifies five categories of technology adopters: innovators, early adopters, early 
majority, late majority, and laggards (as illustrated in Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Technology Adoption Cycle59 
These categories are based on “ideal types,” which is a categorization methodology 
linked to how an individual’s intrinsic values will affect their adoption of a new 
technology.60 Rogers correctly acknowledges that, regardless of the designed use or 
purpose of a technology, individuals’ “psychological and social profiles” will affect the 
point at which they will adopt a new technology.61 Effectively, his research demonstrates 
that as an innovation progresses toward mainstream acceptance, it will go through a fairly 
predictable adoption cycle.62 The basis of how a regulatory group will identify the 
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60 Ibid., 282. 
61 Geoffrey Moore, Crossing the Chasm: Marketing and Selling High-Tech Products to Mainstream 
Customers (New York: HarperBusiness, 1999), 13. 
62 Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations, 22 and 279–85. 
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appropriate time to attempt some form of EDT threat mitigation rests on their 
understanding of the characteristics that make up each adoption group, especially the 
differences between the early adopters and the early majority. 
1. Innovators 
The first and smallest adoption category (2.5 percent) is the innovators. These are 
the individuals in a society who are continuously seeking out and applying new ideas and 
technology as soon as they become available. Motivated by the need always to be the first 
to incorporate a new technology, innovators must rely on their own judgment and 
technical abilities to determine how to integrate the new innovation. Therefore, they are 
willing to accept substantial risk of failure and setbacks during their adoption process. 
One of the most important roles that innovators serve is as “gatekeeper” between 
inventors and end users (consumers) of a new innovation. An innovator’s acceptance of a 
new technology can effectively begin, or quickly end, the diffusion process.63   
2. Early Adopters  
The next category in the technology adoption cycle is the early adopters. Even 
though these individuals comprise the second-smallest category (13.5 percent), their 
opinions of a new technology are extremely important to the overall diffusion process. As 
Rogers stipulates, the early adopter’s “stamp of approval” is how this adopter category 
manages to “decrease uncertainty about a new idea,” which enables a technology’s 
continued diffusion.64 Additionally, they are intricately involved with change agents and 
have substantial influence over whether or not a technology will reach critical mass.65 
Early adopters are continually seeking out new technologies and they understand that an 
emerging innovation may fail to meet all stated expectations. If innovators are the 
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gatekeepers who allow a technology to move from the lab to the public, the early 
adopters serve as the pathway toward mainstream acceptance.  
3. Early Majority 
As the early majority adopts a technology, the adoption rate moves toward its 
highest point on the bell-curve–shaped technology adoption cycle. Made up of followers, 
rather than leaders, the early majority forms one of the two largest categories of the 
technology adoption cycle. Totaling 34 percent of a society’s technology adopters, the 
early majority is, in Rogers’s description, “deliberate” in its actions. He indicates that 
while the early majority is willing to accept a new technology, these individuals will only 
do so if they can identify a specific and beneficial use for it. In other words, the early 
majority’s motivation for technology adoption is driven more by “needs,” rather than 
“wants.” Therefore, even though this group approves of the benefits that can be had from 
technological advances, it has minimal patience for technology that fails to meet their 
expectations.66  
4. Late Majority 
The late majority also makes up one third of the adoption. However, it differs 
markedly from the early majority in that this group is “skeptical” of adopting a new 
technology until it is a proven commodity. This group looks to the preceding adoption 
groups to demonstrate the benefits of the technology before it is willing to accept the 
innovation. Additionally, it is necessary to remove the safety and security risks before 
this group will begin to integrate the new technology into its established system.67  
5. Laggards 
Finally, the last adoption category comprises the laggards. This group accounts 
for the trailing 16 percent of the social system that adopts a technology. For laggards, the 
decision to adopt is not simply based on proving that the new technology is beneficial;  
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instead laggards need to be shown the deficiencies in the technology they are currently 
using. In other words laggards “must be certain that a new idea will not fail before they 
can adopt.”68 
C. STRATEGIC INFLECTION POINT, DOMINANT DESIGN, AND 
CRITICAL MASS 
Often as technologies propagate through a society they reach a point at which 
they either become accepted by the masses or simply slip into oblivion. This section will 
highlight three concepts—strategic inflection point, dominant design, and critical mass – 
that can help a regulatory group identify which technologies have the best chance at 
progressing toward ubiquity. 
1. Strategic Inflection Point 
The strategic inflection point is used to signify a definitive change from the old to 
the new or the negative to the positive.69 Figure 2 shows that when a business reaches an 
inflection point, its future growth will either improve or decline. 
 
Figure 2.  Strategic Inflection Point70 
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On the macro level, Andrew Grove claims that in most situations, it is nearly impossible 
to tell the specific moment when a strategic inflection point occurs. However, 
Brynjolfsson and McAfee argue that the United States is currently in the middle of a 
profoundly significant inflection point—what they call the “second machine age.” Based 
on Moore’s Law, Brynjolfsson and McAfee claim that over the next quarter-century, 
computing power will increase “over a thousand-fold,” pushing society toward “the 
creation of true machine intelligence and the connection of all humans via a common 
digital network.”71 For society to increase its chances for a positive improvement after it 
passes this inflection point, its first step is to recognize and accept the changes that are 
occurring so that it can facilitate the new innovation’s widespread diffusion and 
adoption.72  
2. Dominant Design 
At more of a micro level, the implications of failing to recognize when an 
inflection point occurs are evident in how a dominant design emerges. In situations where 
competing innovations are vying for a market that is only able to sustain one design, the 
strategic inflection point represents the point at which one design succeeds and the other 
fails.73 Examples are the introduction of videocassette magnetic tape recording devices 
(Betamax in 1975 and VHS in 1976) and high-definition optical disc storage formats 
(both Blu-ray and HD-DVD were released in the United States during 2006). One of 
these technologies was destined to become the nation’s standard, but the driving force 
behind that decision was not based on the innovation that was technologically superior; 
rather, the deciding factors were its adoption by correlative industries and the product’s 
marketing efforts. James Utterback and William Abernathy, who coined the term 
dominant design, also posit that once a dominant design is widely accepted, it will remain 
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the predominant choice until a new disruptive innovation restarts the process (in this case, 
VHS was not ousted until DVDs became the new standard).74 
3. Critical Mass 
Influenced by the technology adoption cycle concept, Frank Bass set out to 
develop a mathematical formula that try and predict the rate of adoption.75 Built with a 
nonlinear differential equation the Bass forecasting model “seeks to forecast how many 
adoptions of a new product will occur at future time periods.”76 While a considerable 
number of sources state that the model has been widely adopted and that it is still in use, 
there is not much empirical evidence that substantiates its effectiveness. However, what 
the Bass forecasting model attempts to predict is the point at which an innovation reaches 
critical mass. 
During the adoption process of a new technology, Thomas Schelling theorizes 
there is a point at which a population’s adoption of an innovation becomes self-
sustaining.77 Termed “critical mass,” it begins when early adopters embrace an 
innovation.78 Once a technology moves passed a strategic inflection point its adoption 
may either progress gradually, or, if it achieves critical mass, it can be propelled forward. 
Figure 3 illustrates that, based on the site’s number of users, Facebook’s adoption 
reached critical mass around 2007. 
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Figure 3.  Number of Facebook users from 2004–201379 
D. THE CHASM 
In order for the momentum from a technology reaching critical mass to carry it 
through to the next adoption category, the early majority, the technology must first cross 
the “chasm.” Geoffrey Moore proposes the chasm concept as a divide that exists between 
the early adopters and the early majority. Figure 4 shows the chasm, as Moore describes 
it. 
 
Figure 4.  The Chasm80 
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According to Moore, “the chasm represents the gulf between two distinct 
marketplaces for technology productions-the first, an early market dominated by early 
adopters and insiders who are quick to appreciate the nature and benefits of the new 
development, and the second a mainstream market representing ‘the rest of us,’ people 
who want the benefits of new technology but who do not want to ‘experience’ it in all its 
gory details.”81 Despite pointing out that there is no research available that fully supports 
Moore’s chasm theory, Rogers does indicate that there are “important differences 
between” adopter categories.82  
Moore insists that when attempting to guide a new technology through the 
adoption cycle marketers must navigate the transition between the foresight of the first 
adopters and the pragmatism of the mainstream market segments, and the most 
challenging division exists between the early adopters and early majority.83 Effectively, 
the movement between these two groups requires a marketing shift whereby the focus 
transitions from the technology to the market that is adopting it. Even though the chasm 
theory is a marketing concept, it properly signifies not only the importance of 
understanding the different characteristics of the adoption groups, but it also highlights a 
point in the adoption cycle where a distributor of an emerging technology would be most 
likely to heed external input.84  
E. THE HYPE CYCLE 
The last concept utilized in this thesis is used to further one’s understanding of the 
complexities of not only technological development, but also technological interest—the 
GartnerGroup’s hype cycle. The GartnerGroup is a private company that has built a 
business around understanding the development of emerging technologies. In an effort to 
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demonstrate that a lifecycle exists for new technologies it developed the “hype cycle.”85 
This decision aid annually outlines current emerging technologies, and for snapshot in 
time, where they are in their development and adoption process.86 However, because 
technologies are not always developed and then adopted in a linear fashion (for example, 
the precursor to the modern day fax machine was invented in 1924, but was not widely 
adopted until the late 1980s), the GarterGroup states that the hype cycle does not attempt 
to predict the future of any of the listed technologies. In other words, just because a 
technology is show to be building momentum in 2014, that does not mean that in 2015 it 
will continue to progress through the cycle.87 
There are five stages to the hype cycle: the innovation trigger, peak of inflated 
expectations, trough of disillusionment, slope of enlightenment, and plateau of 
productivity.88 As demonstrated in Figure 5, each stage is used to represent the critical 
junctures of a technology’s development and diffusion life cycle. 
 
Figure 5.  GartnerGroup’s Hype Cycle89 
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Overall, the hype cycle seeks to visually represent the “interplay of two factors: human 
nature and the nature of innovation.”90 Even though the development of new innovations 
has historically been aligned with human nature (i.e., humans would invent a technology 
for a defined purpose), modern technological advances have managed to push these two 
factors “out of sync” with one another.91 This progression has reached a point where, 
“technological progress and social progress…often conflict.”92 
The hype cycle begins with the innovation trigger, which is the event that first 
introduces the technology to a society. In many cases this occurs with the release of a 
beta version of the technology. As the “hype” in the technology begins to build the 
interest in the technology progresses toward the peak of inflated expectations. A 
technology is effectively pushed toward this “peak” by media hype and “a bandwagon 
effect.”93 However, when the technology fails to meet all of the expectations set before it, 
or problems with its development arise, it starts to slide into the trough of disillusionment 
where a technology could remain for a substantial period of time if there is nothing to 
push or pull it to the next stage of the cycle. A causal factor for this stagnation is the lack 
of public interest in continued development that leads to a stalled rate of adoption.  
While in the trough, many innovations go through considerable changes in order 
to climb the slope of enlightenment. A major contributing factor that facilitates a 
technology’s continued progression through the cycle is, “drawing on the experience of 
early adopters,” whereby “understanding grows about where the innovation can be used 
to good effect,” states Fenn and Raskino.94 Once a technology summits the slope, it 
enters into the plateau of productivity. Represented by stable and refined product releases 
that mitigate adoption risks, the plateau is where widespread adoption begins and 
profitability from the technology is possible.95  
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F. CONCLUSION 
Despite decades of modern innovation development and discussions about the 
inherent risks with widespread adoption of many emerging technologies, there are still 
those in today’s society that, like Segal, believe modern technology, “remains ill-defined, 
poorly conceived, and misunderstood by many.”96 However, this is a self-induced and 
self-perpetuated problem that does not require a complex or convoluted solution. In fact, 
New Order Amish have, since their formation in the 1960s, understood that the 
integration of a technology into their community will introduce unknown and unexpected 
changes.97 Unlike the Old Order Amish, the New Order does not wholly ignore 
technological advances, instead “they seek those aspects of an innovation that support the 
lives they want, and avoid those aspects that weaken or detract from such lives.”98 While 
their technology assessment process can be fairly lengthy, the lesson that mainstream 
society needs to learn from this small sect of individuals is that, “nothing actually 
compels us to adopt every new technology and embrace every new idea.”99  
The concepts described in this chapter intend to provide the necessary background 
material needed to understand the intricacies of technology innovation, diffusion, and 
adoption. For years futurists, like Toffler, have tried to warn society about the risks that 
are inherent in its historical “adopt and see” approach to evaluating emerging 
technologies. In order to heed their warnings, and adopt a more proactive approach to 
technology related threat mitigation efforts, society must use the complexities inherent in 
technology development to their advantage. Specifically, regulatory or threat mitigation 
efforts must be enacted during the period of time where there is a lull in the innovation 
processes. 
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IV. IDENTIFYING THE WINDOW 
Though the influence of invention may be so great as to be immeasurable, 
as in the case of gunpowder or the printing press, there is usually 
opportunity to anticipate its impact upon society since it never comes 
instantaneously without signals. For invention is a process and there are 
faint beginnings, development, diffusion, and social influences, occurring 
in sequence.100  
Due to the complexities of integrating disruptive technologies into the nation’s 
industry and culture, the government and the private sector have chosen to adopt a “wait 
and see” approach to addressing threats that stem from the introduction of disruptive 
technologies. In other words, any effort made to protect against threats from a new 
technology are often limited until misuse or criminality presents a constant threat to the 
American public. While it is important for government and industry to acknowledge that 
trying to regulate or police all emerging technologies is fiscally irresponsible and socially 
unacceptable, they also may not simply stand idly by while individual citizens and private 
businesses are forced to protect themselves from newly developed emerging threats. 
The first step toward developing a method of mitigating threats from EDTs is 
acknowledging that the nation is on the cusp of entering Brynjolfsson and McAfee’s 
second machine age. The evidence of this strategic inflection point manifests itself 
through the increased pace of innovation development, sources and methods of 
technology diffusion, and the subsequent changes in industry that result. “Many 
technologies that used to be found only in science fiction are becoming everyday reality,” 
the authors write, and with these additions society is facing “difficult challenges and 
choices.”101 There is no reason to fear the second machine age because it is a change that 
represents progress; rather, society should proceed with a cautious optimism toward the 
integration of new and unproven technologies.  
Through an in-depth understanding of the innovation development, adoption, and 
diffusion process, it is possible to identify a window of opportunity where the 
                                                 
100 National Resources Committee, “Technological Trends and National Policy,” ix. 
101 Brynjolfsson and McAfee, The Second Machine Age, 11 and 34. 
 34 
introduction of proactive security measures would have the best chance of mitigating the 
development of future threats.102 This window exists where a new technology falls into 
the chasm that occurs as it transitions from the early adopters to early majority in 
Rogers’s technology adoption cycle; it also appears when the technology slides into the 
hype cycle’s trough of disillusionment. In order for a disruptive technology to cross the 
chasm and climb out of the trough, it must meet the needs of the follow on adoption 
groups as it secures itself as a viable innovation. Thus, this alignment of the chasm and 
the trough create a window of opportunity where technology developers, producers, and 
distributors are receptive and appreciative of external input.  
Tucker points that the life of a disruptive technology begins in one of four places 
that conduct R&D: “private industry, government research laboratories, universities or 
nonprofit research institutes, and entities outside a formal institutional context,” (i.e., the 
at home inventor).103 The dynamic nature of the innovation development process, 
combined with the fluidity of these R&D environments, precludes identifying security 
and safety concerns prior to the innovation trigger. “In spite of popular stereotypes to the 
contrary, an innovation doesn’t spring fully formed from the mind of the inventor and 
into the hands of the user. It needs a period of time to diffuse in markets,” where its real 
purpose and usefulness can be discovered.104 Therefore, the starting point for an 
evaluation of an emerging disruptive innovation begins with the innovators and their 
recognition of the innovation trigger.  
“Innovations can have an extremely long research and development preamble 
before they reach a meaningful trigger point, including several false starts with minor 
peaks and troughs,” contend Fenn and Raskino.105 It takes the actions and involvement of 
the innovators—and their “venturesome” nature—to detect and approve when an 
innovation trigger occurs and it is time to initiate the start of the diffusion process. 
Alternatively, in some cases, the innovators’ investigation into the possible uses of a new 
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technology can produce an innovation trigger. In either case, it is the innovator’s 
influence that begins to push a new technology through the beginning of the hype cycle 
toward the peak of inflated expectations.  
A. UNDERSTANDING EARLY ADOPTERS 
If the innovators push the technology toward the peak, then the early adopters are 
the ones who pull it the rest of the way up. As Rogers writes, “Earlier Adopters have 
greater empathy, less dogmatism, a greater ability to deal with abstractions, greater 
rationality, greater intelligence, a more favorable attitude toward change, a greater ability 
to cope with uncertainty and risk, a more favorable attitude toward science, less fatalism 
and greater self-efficacy,” when compared to their later-adopter counterparts.106 As 
demonstrated in a wide range of different fields of innovation, the involvement of the 
early adopter category is an important step toward a technology’s continued diffusion.107 
In many ways this group’s approval and acceptance of a new technology can serve as an 
indispensable filter—or the voice of reason—between the risk-taking innovators and the 
more conservative later adopters.  
As the technology progresses toward the peak, it approaches its first strategic 
inflection point. Due to the infancy of the technology and the limited scope of its 
adoption, it is highly susceptible to social contagion—otherwise known as the 
bandwagon effect.108 Therefore, the positive or negative direction of this phenomenon 
may push the technology toward a higher peak, or start its slide into the trough of 
disillusionment. Even if the technology is able to progress to a higher peak of inflated 
expectations, when its momentum subsides it will begin to slide into the trough. One of 
the situations that can interrupt the diffusion of a technology, and curb its momentum, is 
the transition from the early adopters to the early majority (i.e., when a technology 
attempts to cross the chasm).  
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B. THE CHASM AND TROUGH 
As a new technology attempts to cross the chasm it slides into the trough of 
disillusionment. This situation produces a lull in both the technology adoption and hype 
cycles (as illustrated in Figure 6) where, if embraced, a new technology could be 
evaluated for safety and security considerations without impacting its further diffusion. 
 
Figure 6.  The Window of Opportunity109 
As Gregory Mandel notes, it is possible to turn the uncertainty that is created by the 
complexities that surround understanding disruptive technologies into an advantage. 
Technology investors, developers, producers, distributors, regulators, and adopters are all 
faced with “common concerns” as the technology remains in the trough/chasm.110 
Mandel asserts that this situation “present[s] a unique opportunity to bring together 
diverse stakeholders to produce a collaborative…process rather than a resource-draining 
adversarial battle,” because “interests and organizations have not yet strongly vested 
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around a particular system or status quo.”111 In other words, all of the involved parties 
want to see the technology climb out of the trough/chasm, and are willing to work 
together to make it happen—even if it involves modifying the technology.112 
A transition from a technology-centric to a market-centric focus is required in 
order to cross the chasm.113 Innovators and early adopters view technology adoption as a 
necessary part of life, and their interest in an emerging technology is heavily influenced 
by a desire of acquiring something that is state-of-the-art. Conversely, the early majority, 
late majority, and laggards, are more skeptical about adoption, and must be shown the 
potential benefits the technology could provide before they will accept it. Overall, the 
early majority, late majority, and laggards have substantially different goals and 
motivations than the innovators and early adopters. In an unregulated environment, like 
the one that surrounds EDTs, “early adopters are the guinea pigs that get hit with the 
problems and risks of an immature innovation,” as the mainstream adoption groups sit on 
the sidelines waiting to see the real-world viability of the technology.114 A significant 
contributor to reducing the adoption risk for later adopters is the mitigation of safety and 
security concerns.115 The benefit of having an adoption group focused on these public 
interest areas, Mandel stipulates, is that they commonly receive “widespread support.”116 
Additionally, by addressing these concerns early in the adoption process it not only 
provides an opportunity to institute controls to mitigate the future illicit use of a 
disruptive technology, but it also has the potential to help enable its future widespread 
diffusion.117 
Taking a lesson from the issues faced by mitigating the dual-use concerns in the 
biotechnology field, Mandel and Gerald Epstein assert that, “intervention at an early 
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stage is…problematic because political interest is low and little is known about the risks 
and benefits of the technology.”118 Before an innovation falls into the trough of 
disillusionment, information about the disruptive technology is widely disseminated in 
order to build up the hype. However, when an innovation is in the trough, a large 
percentage of population is still trying to make up its mind about the technology’s future 
viability.119 Therefore, at the bottom of the trough, another strategic inflection point 
exists. 
Even though the trough provides an opportunity for a second generation of the 
technology to be released, along with a shift in marketing to focus on mainstream 
adopters, industry leaders often face significant challenges in initiating the requisite 
changes. These challenges occur because, as Grove points out, “the more successful a 
participant was in the old industry structure, the more threatened it is by the change and 
the more reluctant it is to adapt to it.”120 However, by uniting around the aforementioned 
uncertainty that exists at this transitional juncture it is possible for a technology to be 
pushed out of the chasm and up the slope of enlightenment by facing head on the 
adoption concerns of the early majority. 
C. ACHIEVING WIDESPREAD ADOPTION 
In 1970, economist Edwin Mansfield demonstrated the inherent diffusion benefits 
to educating users about a technology prior to their adoption.121 Because the early 
majority are not considered leaders and have no vested interest in a disruptive 
technology’s future diffusion, their real contribution is the manner in which they “provide 
interconnectedness in the system’s interpersonal networks.”122 However, this 
characteristic can either be an advantage or disadvantage to a diffusing technology. If the 
early majority does not approve of the technology’s benefits and begin adopting it en 
masse, the technology may not make it very far up the slope (and completely out of the 
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chasm) before it stagnates. Conversely, by learning and adapting an innovation based on 
feedback from the innovator’s and early adopter’s value networks, it is possible for those 
marketing the technology to harness the “deliberate” nature of the early majority to help 
the technology diffuse into the late majority.123 
Disruptive technologies have a tendency to fail if they are introduced before end 
users actually need or want them.124 Therefore, it is not possible to force the adoption of 
a new technology on later adopters without educating them on its value adding benefits. 
This education can be accomplished by creating a support system that makes the 
technology more user friendly and lowers adoption risks.125 With the ultimate goal of 
achieving critical mass, a technology’s progression up the slope of enlightenment is 
directly related to mitigating the early majority’s adoption hurdles. Often, as a technology 
“matures from an uncertain value proposition with high risk of failure to a predictable 
value proposition with low risk…it goes mainstream.”126 Once established on the slope, 
the transition to the plateau of productivity and the later adoption groups (late majority 
and laggards) becomes dependent on whether or not the focus can remain on the needs of 
the technology’s market, rather than the technology itself.  
In the plateau, “most of the problems and unknowns have been ironed out of the 
innovation by earlier adopters, and the cost and functionality of products have 
stabilized.”127 Once this stabilization occurs, a market and/or industry will begin to form 
around the disruptive technology, and pull it toward full maturity and societal 
integration.128 Additionally, “the hype around it typically disappears and is replaced by a 
solid body of knowledge.”129 The primary concerns for the technology’s future are now 
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centered on its long-term market viability and its continued return on investment. This 
new environment encourages not only the “skeptical” late majority, but also the more 
cautious laggards, to begin integrating the technology.130  
D. FACILITATING DIFFUSION AND ADOPTION 
In a closed system, perhaps an ideal world, the process of a disruptive 
technology’s diffusion and adoption would always follow a predefined path. For better or 
worse, however, these processes—diffusion and adoption—occur in the real world, 
where the lifecycle of a technology constantly interacts with the unpredictability of 
human nature and market influences. In some cases this interaction can produce 
unbelievable advances in an individual’s quality of life, while in others it can introduce 
unexpected and uncontrollable risks. Therefore, because “it is often impossible to predict 
what products and risks will need to be governed even a short time into the future,” it is 
unadvisable for the diffusion and adoption process to proceed completely unabated.131  
At its core, the hype cycle strives to depict visually how today’s “hyperconnected 
society” handles the constant introduction of the “never-ending waves of potential 
innovations.”132 One method of guiding the nation’s “experimental culture” through this 
sea of new, and in some cases unrefined, technologies is through the use of change 
agents.133 A change agent is an individual or group that works to “influence clients’ 
innovation-decisions” by providing a “communication link between a resource system 
with some kind of expertise and client system,” explains Rogers.134 Change agents are 
capable of making a difference in a technology’s diffusion and adoption because 
information about a new technology will spread faster than its adoption.135 The ultimate 
goal of these agents is to help avoid the disequilibrium that occurs when a system or 
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structure cannot handle the rate at which changes are occurring within it.136 Through 
understanding the requirements and expectations of each adoption group, and thereby 
working to alter the diffusion and adopting process as needed, change agents can help a 
technology pass successfully through its strategic inflection points.137 These added 
benefits of change agents are especially important when the emerging technology is a 
disruptive innovation. An alternative to using change agents to facilitate adoption and 
diffusion is through a “technological ombudsman.” 
Morison and Toffler were both advocates for instituting regulatory controls in 
order to protect the general public from unrestricted technological advances.138 One of 
their solutions was to introduce what Toffler called a technological ombudsman.139 
Defined by Toffler as “a public agency charged with receiving, investigating, and acting 
on complaints having to do with the irresponsible application of technology,” the 
technological ombudsman concept was never put into place.140 Nevertheless, the 
importance of incorporating the involvement of an ombudsman into the diffusion and 
adoption process cannot be disregarded. By empowering change agents or ombudsmen to 
integrate lessons learned from innovators and early adopters into their communication 
linking endeavors, it is possible for a regulatory or security minded organization to 
achieve the same goal without any additional bureaucracy. Effectively, this conceptual 
design would use the innovator and early adopter groups as a risk and threat assessment 
filter before a disruptive technology continues to diffuse. This approach ultimately 
provides organizations a method of reducing risks associated with wasting “time, money, 
and opportunity” when attempting to incorporate regulatory or security controls.141 
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E. TIMING REGULATORY CONTROLS WITH THE WINDOW 
Once the importance of the window of opportunity—and how it can affect 
changes in the diffusion and adoption process—is understood, the next step is figuring 
out how to properly time the introduction of safety and security measures. Due to the 
dynamic and fluid nature of the innovation process, new technologies need time to 
diffuse before their impact can truly be understood.142 Both the technology adoption and 
hype cycle demonstrate that “the early stages of an emerging technology’s development 
present a unique opportunity to shape its future. But it is an opportunity that does not 
remain open forever.”143 It is not matter of predicting the future impact of a technology 
because, as Tenner emphasizes, the involvement of “human culture and behavior” make 
that an unrealistic goal.144 Instead, the emphasis must be on using technology forecasting 
to help identify how a technology is most likely going to develop. 
For the purposes of this thesis, technology forecasting is defined as estimates 
about the future progression of a new technology based “upon an explicit, stated set of 
relationships, data, and assumptions” that can be reproduced by following a basic 
“system of logic.”145 By developing and testing each of these projections independently, 
it is possible to assign each one a different level of confidence. The goal of this process is 
to help decision makers understand how a new technology may develop over time. 
However, it is important to note that technology forecasting is only about the technology, 
it does not take into account the impact that human and market influences can have on a 
technology as it matures.146 Historically, industry and technology experts have been the 
primary source of technology forecasting data.147  
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While technology forecasting is not a new concept, the manner in which it is 
conducted has changed over the years. One of the problems with using only a select 
group to create a forecast is that their assumptions and decisions can be clouded, or even 
manipulated, by external influences.148 For the last few decades, references to a new 
technology in the media have been one method of measuring its future expectations.149 In 
other words, according to Fenn and Raskino, “the more newsworthy an innovation is, the 
more expectations rise, and that becomes a reinforcing cycle.”150 However, this method 
shares the same disadvantage as the use of technology experts—when a select group 
controls assessments, their actions can easily become tainted by alternative agendas. With 
the advent, diffusion, and adoption of online social media, it is now possible to use 
information gathered through these networks to conduct social network analysis in near-
real time.  
Experimentations conducted that gathered information (tweets) from the social 
media and micro-blogging service Twitter, demonstrate the utility of using social media 
to help time the window of opportunity. In 2010, Sitaram Asur and Bernardo Huberman 
of HP’s Social Computing Lab were able to use tweets to accurately predict movie box-
office revenue.151 In their paper, they emphasize that social media is “a form of collective 
wisdom…usually more accurate than other techniques for extracting diffuse 
information.”152 Concluding that the information gathered through social media is an 
“effective indicator of real-world performance,” Rumi Chunara, Jason Andrews, and 
John Brownstein of Harvard Medical School tested this theory against the spread of 
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cholera during the 2010 Haitian outbreak.153 They showed how tweets could accurately 
track the spread of the disease up to two weeks faster than official reporting methods.154 
In a similar fashion, “if people are inclined toward adopting an innovation, they will seek 
out examples that show why it’s a good idea.”155 Thanks to society’s ubiquitous use of 
online social media networks, which now contributes to a large part of what generates the 
hype around a new technology, their actions can be tracked and analyzed.  
This type of analysis of big data has given way to the development of a new field 
of study: social physics. Using big data to explain human behavior, social physics is able 
to produce timely and accurate results, and provide a cost effective method of timing the 
window of opportunity.156  
While technology forecasting helps identify the possible future of a disruptive 
technology, technology roadmapping is a way for society to try and prepare for the 
effects it may have after its widespread diffusion.157 The flexible roadmapping process 
“provides a structured (and often graphical) means for exploring and communicating the 
relationships between evolving and developing markets, products and technologies over 
time.”158 Even though the end product is often thought of as quite simple, the process of 
creating a roadmap is highly involved and challenging. Thus, the majority of the benefits 
gained from building a roadmap are derived from its creation process.159 By bringing 
together diverse types of people that come from different backgrounds, creating a 
technology roadmap becomes “an opportunity for sharing information and perspectives 
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and providing a vehicle for holistic consideration of problems, opportunities and new 
ideas.”160 Ultimately, the roadmap serves as guideline for society to comprehend and 
adapt to the future implications of an EDT. 
Once a technology forecast and roadmap have been considered by a regulatory or 
security minded organization, the next step in understanding and planning for the future 
impact of a new technology is developing technological foresight. Ellul explains that 
foresight is a means of making a realistic assessment of a situation and putting together a 
plan to mitigate the associated risks of technology adoption. This assessment can be 
accomplished by taking an almost purely pessimistic view of a disruptive technology 
whereby society only considers the worst-case scenarios that could stem from the 
adoption and diffusion of a new technology. Once solutions are developed to these 
problems, the next step is designing an implementation plan. In his book, The 
Technological Bluff, Ellul demonstrates how technological foresight could help address 
how society could put together a plan to deal with nuclear power plants when they reach 
the end of their expected life.161 
These plans and procedures are an attempt to take advantage of a specific window 
of opportunity in the adoption and diffusion process of an EDT. An important benefit of 
this point in time is that only a limited number of adopters—those with the most 
technological knowledge and highest risk acceptance levels—have been exposed to the 
new technology. By developing and integrating a continual feedback process by which 
these early adopters can provide safety and security recommendations, it is possible to 
mitigate the risks that approximately 80 percent of the total adopting population could 
potentially face.  
When considering an innovation’s full lifecycle the timeframe that it is in the 
chasm and the trough of disillusionment is relatively short. Through using information 
harnessed from social media networks, in particular the creation or recent passing of a 
strategic inflection point, it is possible to identify when a window is occurring. Then, 
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after implementing a method to collect information about future risks from early adopter 
categories and figuring out how to recognize when the window of opportunity occurs, the 
next step is putting a plan into place that will protect the population from the potential 
illicit appropriation of a disruptive technology 
F. CONCLUSION 
Even though the nation’s economy has been built on technological advancement, 
political institutions are still not capable of addressing concerns of emerging technology 
in a timely and comprehensive manner, the pace of diffusion and adoption continues to 
increase bringing about more instances of future shock, and corporations are rarely held 
accountable when their technology is used with illicit intent. Segal asserts that American 
society seems to operate under “the painfully naïve assumption that the technological 
optimism that has historically characterized American society and culture will or must 
continue unabated.”162 However, as this chapter demonstrates, it is possible to institute a 
threat mitigation process that will not only allow an emerging technology to follow a 
traditional path toward ubiquity, but one that could also increase its rate of diffusion and 
adoption.163  
The window of opportunity described herein does not represent an all-or-nothing 
period of action; rather it is the ideal timeframe to introduce new regulatory controls 
and/or security measures that will not inhibit the technology’s future progress based on 
the state of the technology’s infrastructure and the psychology of its user base. By 
targeting the lull that an emerging technology experiences while in the trough of 
disillusionment, otherwise known as the chasm that exists between the early adopter and 
early majority groups, it is possible to inject regulatory controls with the least impact on 
the technology’s further development, diffusion, and adoption.  
While it is still possible to enact protective measures after this window, the delay 
will result in larger implementation hurtles and could ultimately stifle the innovation’s 
further progression. Online social networking sites provide an opportunity to analyze 
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these networks in near real time, thus providing a practical and cost effective method of 
not only tracking a technology through its adoption cycle and timing the window of 
opportunity, but also the point at which a new technology reaches critical mass. 
Additionally, even though rapid prototyping and direct to user distribution has increased 
the pace of diffusion and adoption, it also provides a “build-in” method of incorporating 
new threat mitigation controls into consecutive versions of a product’s design.  
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V. HOMELAND SECURITY 
A prerequisite for effective governance is the ability to assess the safety 
and security risks of a technology.164 
Emerging disruptive technologies are completely neutral objects. In their most 
simplistic form, these new technologies are tools that a society can use in either a positive 
or negative manner.165 Despite the steps an inventor may take to mitigate a technology’s 
potential for illicit use, he is ultimately limited by his perspective and imagination. The 
inventor may become “boresighted” on the problem the technology is being developed to 
solve, rather than the implications of the technology’s impact. In other words, the 
inventor focuses on what the technology will do, rather than what the technology will 
change. The problem this creates is that society is left unprotected against the adverse 
costs associated with adopting a new technology. These unintended and unforeseen 
adoption consequences that only emerge after the technology has diffused are known as 
“revenge effects.”166  
While all innovations will incur some level of revenge effects, the reason that 
EDTs are a more significant concern is because “disruptive technologies often enable 
something to be done that previously had been deemed impossible. Because of this, when 
they initially emerge, neither manufacturers nor customers know how or why their 
products will be used.”167 These concerns are precisely why Edward Tenner’s book, Why 
Things Bite Back, argues for the American public to take a cautious approach to allowing 
new technologies to become part of their daily lives.168 By understanding the 
implications associated with an EDT before its widespread diffusion, it may be possible 
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to mitigate future revenge effects. Therefore, as emphasized by Toffler, “we can no 
longer afford to let…secondary social and cultural effects just ‘happen.’ We must attempt 
to anticipate them in advance, estimating, to the degree possible, their nature, strength 
and timing.”169 
The intention of this chapter is to showcase how domestic law enforcement (in its 
current design) is willfully unprepared to address the threats that society faces from not 
only revenge effects, but also the illicit appropriation of an EDT. In order for law 
enforcement to fill this capability gap, they must embrace a developing intelligence 
field—homeland security intelligence (HSINT). Ultimately, a properly structured and 
utilized HSINT community could utilize the criteria outlined in this thesis to provide 
domestic law enforcement organizations the “edge” they need to combat future 
technology related threats. 
A. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE 
“Government bureaucracies designed to maintain a stable, fair, and open society 
are increasingly being outpaced by changing technologies and emerging trends,” asserts 
Christopher Kluckuhn.170 If the rate of public adoption of an EDT exceeds the ability of 
the government or private sector to institute security measures, then the public may face 
unforeseen and unintentional threats to its safety. Furthermore, if a new technology is 
appropriated from the task for which it was designed and used criminally, the security 
implications become even more complex and urgent. Rather than attempt to regulate or 
police all EDTs, the United States must endorse the further development and integration 
of HSINT. 
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In the wake of 9/11, DHS was created. Its overall mission is to “ensure a 
homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards.”171 The 
broad and all-encompassing nature of this mission could be compounded exponentially 
by the illicit appropriation of an EDT. As Brynjolfsson and McAfee assert, as 
technologies become more advanced and ubiquitous the people who adopt them may not 
be “both sane and well intentioned.”172 Even more concerning is that “the physical limits 
on how much damage any individual or small group could do are becoming less and less 
constrained.”173 Therefore, because it is unrealistic for DHS to try and protect against all 
possible threats, it must find a way to screen and assess the threats it will attempt to 
mitigate with its limited resources. 
Raw information is of little use to decision makers within the DHS simply 
because of the vast amount that is collected on a daily basis by numerous domestic law 
enforcement agencies. In many cases, raw information can be more of a distraction than a 
force multiplier. As emphasized by Ian Lustick in Trapped in the War on Terror, the 
FBI’s reaction to 9/11 was to investigate every single tip it received that had anything to 
do with terrorism. Despite the fact that within the first week after 9/11 the FBI received 
more than 96,000 leads (by the end of the first year, it was more than 400,000), it was 
determined to investigate every one—no matter how insignificant or irrational the tips 
may have appeared. Lustick contends that the FBI needed to institute a form of “triage” 
that would allow it to focus on the more credible and timely threats. Effectively, what 
Lustick is stating is that the FBI needed intelligence personnel to analyze the tips before 
field agents started their investigations.174    
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As outlined in the Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Publication (JP-2), 
“[i]nformation is of greatest value when it contributes to or shapes the commander’s 
decision-making process by providing reasoned insight into future conditions or 
situations.”175 While it is possible to collect massive amounts of data easily these days, 
the information is relatively worthless until qualified intelligence personnel analyze it. 
This process of analysis is what turns raw data into usable intelligence. Thus, 
contributing to what Mark Lowenthal considers in the journal Intelligence and National 
Security the single most important purpose of intelligence—helping to “reduce 
uncertainty.”176 Since the implications of EDTs diffusion and adoption are an area of 
technological development that introduces a high level of uncertainty, it is necessary for 
domestic law enforcement to develop a process that will help mitigate any of newly 
created safety and security threats.  
In order to use intelligence to help mitigate an EDT threat, it is critical for the 
domestic intelligence community (IC) to rethink the first two elements of intelligence: 
collection and analysis.177 Historically, the determining factor of an analyst’s 
qualifications is based on the medium of the collected information (e.g., someone who 
analyzes signal intelligence [SIGINT] is a SIGINT analyst). In other words, the type of 
information is what defines the analyst. 
However, unlike other intelligence disciplines that are defined by the specific 
manner in which analysts collect and focus their efforts primarily on foreign collection, 
domestic intelligence is an amalgamation of all the other “INTs” and specifically directed 
at a democratic populace.178 Unofficially referred to as HSINT, the basis of this 
discipline requires intelligence personnel to navigate a diverse set of collection methods 
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within a complex operating environment in order to support its customer, domestic law 
enforcement agencies. Therefore, HSINT challenges the traditional IC’s norms, and 
requires the analyst to define the type of information that is needed based on the current 
case—a HSINT analyst may need imagery intelligence (IMINT) for the first case, and 
communication intelligence (COMINT) for second. Additionally, in the case of EDTs, 
HSINT can also act as a method to screen raw information prior to its distribution either 
to domestic law enforcement agencies or the American public. 
Domestic law enforcement needs creditable intelligence on “the subset of 
emerging technologies that are potential game changers because they could result in 
harmful consequences far more serious than is possible with existing technologies.”179 
Because it is not possible to accurately predict how or at what rate a new technology will 
diffuse through a society, how a society will adapt to the technology, or how a 
technology will develop once it is adopted, it is possible for properly trained HSINT 
personnel to focus specifically on how to mitigate the illicit appropriation of the new 
capability that an EDT will introduce.  
For example, the diffusion of 3D printers permits individuals to create and 
manufacture three-dimensional objects at home. While the intended usage is for safe and 
innocent at-home projects, the technology combined with online collaboration enables 
users to make high quality firearm parts and high-capacity magazines by simply 
downloading a CAD file.180 This manner of production not only circumvents the 
requirement of a Type 07 federal firearms license, but it also provides a method for those 
with felony convictions to easily acquire a firearm.181 In this case, HSINT personnel 
could evaluate whether or not the diffusion of a high quality, precision, unregulated, and 
                                                 
179 Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and Security, 3. 
180 These files contain all of the information needed so that a 3D printer can create an object. While 
conventionally they require significant experience and education to create, they are now available for 
download via online collaboration sites. This method of acquiring a CAD file removes the necessity of 
individuals having any background knowledge in gunsmithing or engineering in order to build a working 
firearm. Also, as an aside, in this situation the internet, an EDT in itself, is acting as a backbone technology 
potentially multiply the threat from 3D printers. 
181 “Listing of Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs)—2014,” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives, United States Department of Justice, accessed May 21, 2014, https://www.atf.gov/content 
/firearms/firearms-industry/listing-FFLs. 
 54 
privacy protected at-home manufacturing device could be illicitly appropriated, and then 
assess if there is a way to mitigate this threat prior to its further adoption.  
By focusing on the new capability that an EDT introduces, the HSINT discipline 
can be distinguished from other new prevention methods that utilize big data and other 
similar technologies in an attempt predict future crimes. The problem with this 
“predictive policing” is that it simply indicates the probability of an offense occurring 
based on historical data, and does not take into account the human element. Additionally, 
“predictive indicators are not universal. [So,] security specialists may have to proceed on 
a case-by-case basis when seeking to anticipate and foil deadly innovations,” concludes 
Rasmussen and Hafez.182 Due to HSINT’s use of information from all of the traditional 
intelligence collection methods (the other “INTs”), this brand of intelligence can be 
adapted to address the varying types of cases that domestic law enforcement agencies 
face on a daily basis. As a testament to the DHS’s mission of all hazard protection, it 
created a specialized division of its Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate that 
specifically focuses on emerging technological based threats—aptly named the Emerging 
Threats Branch. 
In light of the vast list of DHS responsibilities, it is unrealistic to insist that the 
task of mitigating threats from EDTs should become a primary mission. However, 
because the nature of the threat is far-reaching (i.e., it is not limited to a defined 
vulnerability within a specific industry), it cannot simply be ignored and restricted to a 
predominantly reactive protection strategy.183  
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B. CONCERNS AND SOLUTIONS 
Even though it is possible to define what HSINT is and identify a need for its 
existence, there is no guarantee that this intelligence discipline will ever be fully endorsed 
and accepted by the American public. Hank Crumpton sums up the concerns over 
widespread domestic intelligence collection by stating that, “excessive defense brings 
unintended negative consequences that may far outweigh the expected benefits.”184 In 
this case, the American public’s concerns over domestic intelligence are not limited to the 
actions of the DHS and accepting HSINT as an intelligence discipline; rather the issues 
are much larger and directed at the domestic IC as a whole.  
Specifically, two of the hurdles that domestic IC must overcome before it can be 
widely accepted into a democratic populace are civil liberty issues and obscure oversight 
structure. In the United States, citizens’ civil liberties are detailed in the Constitution, 
specifically the Bill of Rights. Recently, concerns over domestic intelligence collection 
methods pose the question as to whether or not there is a tradeoff between the need for 
increased security and being able to protect an individual’s civil liberties. Ideally, as 
stipulated in the 9/11 Commission report, there is no reason for this type of tradeoff to 
occur; but, in reality, on more than one occasion the U.S. government has violated an 
individual’s civil liberties under the guise of national security.185 Examples of such civil 
liberty infringements include the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II, 
and more recently, the profiling of Muslim Americans after 9/11.  
In many ways, these governmental actions are strikingly similar to how the 
National Security Agency (NSA) accidently collects information on American citizens. 
Even though the information (referred to within the community as inadvertent collection) 
is not releasable to domestic law enforcement agencies and it is quickly disregarded, an 
individual’s civil liberties were still violated. If HSINT or any type of domestic  
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intelligence collection becomes an accepted intelligence discipline, then more likely than 
not the chances of inadvertent collection—and, hence, civil-liberties violations—will 
increase. 
At the same time, individuals who wish to cause harm often exploit, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, the Constitution’s civil liberty protections in order to 
hide the preparation of an attack. The predicament that law enforcement faces is that 
there are those within American society that have a preconceived notion that all domestic 
intelligence collection is detrimental to the nation’s democratic environment. However, 
with respect to mitigating threats from EDTs, it is possible to restrict HSINT personnel to 
focusing specifically on the capabilities of a new technology and the manner in which it 
could be illicitly appropriated. This approach would prevent domestic intelligence 
collection on specific individuals, thereby greatly reducing the potential for civil liberty 
violations.  
An additional benefit of concentrating domestic collection efforts away from 
specific individuals is that the intelligence concerning the EDT could be distributed 
outside of the domestic IC. As an example, the information that the HSINT community 
collects could be provided to the inventor and manufacturer of the technology so that they 
could modify future releases, for example, by creating a Version 2 of their product that 
reduces the technology’s risk of illicit appropriation. As illustrated by Crumpton, 
“superior intelligence and superior strategy, founded on a partnership with greater 
America, can also achieve victory with minimized cost to civil liberties at home.”186 
Even more significantly, if this cooperative approach could go beyond just EDT threats 
and be adopted for other technologically related threats, then the overall manner in which 
DHS and other domestic law enforcement agencies protect the public does not necessitate 
a change. Instead, the public would only need to ensure that domestic intelligence actions 
have proper oversight to prevent the intelligence agencies from overstepping their 
specified boundaries. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
All technology is not bad. In agreement with Eduardo Calvillo Gámez and 
Rodrigo Nieto-Gómez, “if the process of committing a crime or illegal conduct is 
properly regulated, then the technology used to pursue it would not need to be punished.” 
187 However, some of the concerns raised with respect to domestic law enforcement 
intelligence collection are based on a perceived tradeoff between security and civil 
liberties. In other words, if domestic law enforcement were to restrict access to a new 
technology due to its potential for illicit appropriation, it could very well violate an 
individual’s civil liberties. While perhaps counter-intuitive, in order to mitigate this 
concern domestic intelligence collection needs to focus its attention on the new 
capabilities that technology introduces not the technology itself.  
In order for the DHS to try and proactively protect the American public from EDT 
based threats, it must embrace the development of a domestic intelligence discipline—
homeland security intelligence. Through proper training and oversight HSINT 
professionals would be capable of protecting American citizen’s civil liberties, while 
actively assessing the potential threats that may stem from a new technology.188 
However, Tucker emphasizes, “as our complex technological civilization continues to 
accelerate into an uncertain future, government alone cannot undertake the challenge of 
managing the risks of emerging…technologies.”189 
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VI. IS REGULATION THE ANSWER? 
No single regulatory agency, or even group of agencies, can 
regulate…emerging technologies effectively and comprehensively.190  
Technological innovation is a driving force behind the prosperity of the U.S. 
economy.191 “Although the government theoretically plays a minor role in a free-
enterprise economy, the U.S. government has become increasingly involved in fostering 
new technology,” insists Patrick Kelly and Melvin Kranzberg.192 Two of the ways that it 
directly contributes to the development of technology are funding and regulation, both of 
which are subject to constant oversight.193 Because inventing new technologies is a 
costly endeavor that cannot guarantee any type of return on investment, the majority of 
the funds the government provides are to businesses within established industries.  
This selective funding approach often limits the type of development to creating 
sustaining technologies. When a sustaining technology is introduced, such as the 
collision-avoidance systems in the automobile industry, it is done in a controlled and 
orderly fashion. This process has been refined over the years to ensure that these new 
systems are tested thoroughly, and proven to be a beneficial safety feature, before their 
widespread adoption is permitted. One such example is the U.S. Department of 
Transportation’s support to the development and integration of vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) 
communications for improving roadway safety.194 While this technology may 
revolutionize transportation, government and industry are jointly developing and 
implementing it in a controlled manner with a specific application. However, EDTs do 
not have any prescribed protective measures in place to evaluate them, which introduces 
significant adoption and diffusion related risks to an unsuspecting public. 
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Historically, the tendency has been for corporations and society to decide how an 
emerging technology will be controlled and used through a “trial and error” type of 
process. There is no formalized process to consider the societal impact of unforeseeable 
and unexpected threats that could stem from the new technology’s integration (its 
revenge effects). Therefore, only when the threats from the technology become 
uncontrollable does the government finally get involved. A contemporary example of this 
is the emergence of online peer-to-peer payment systems like Bitcoin. Bitcoin was left to 
proliferate without government involvement or recognition until it was adopted as a safe 
haven for anonymously transferring money for illicit activities and the collapse of Mt. 
Gox, a bitcoin exchange.195 The problem with this method of protection is that 
governmental based actions are typically a tediously slow and complex process.196 
Additionally, by relying on a bureaucratic approach, the government would be restricted 
to only enacting reactive security and safety measures.  
While some Americans associate the term “regulation” with “restriction,” there 
are cases where regulation, for instance, setting industry standards, helps to proliferate 
new technologies and increase their rate adoption. According to the Porter hypothesis, 
strict regulatory controls can enhance competitiveness between companies by challenging 
them to meet new standards; companies that can develop the new technology the fastest 
will have the advantage of being the first to bring it to market.197 In the United States, 
funding and regulation tend to serve as enablers to encourage companies to innovate 
because the government does not micro-manage every aspect of the R&D process.  
The concern, however, is that when large established companies are working with 
the government to innovate, they tend to protect their market share fiercely by either 
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buying up or forcing smaller companies out of the market.198 Thus, it is frequently 
difficult for a new company to enter one of the nation’s established industry sectors 
because large corporations control the majority of the market. This monopolistic obstacle 
can become a form of self-regulation that inhibits the introduction of new disruptive 
technologies. In this book, The Master Switch, Tim Wu illustrates this dynamic with a 
historical example. In 1934, Wu writes, AT&T’s Bell Labs developed an answering 
machine but kept it from the public because the company did not feel the technology was 
commercially viable. At the time, AT&T executives were concerned that the recording of 
phone calls would adversely affect their customers’ telephone usage. AT&T’s actions 
limited the development of magnetic tape technology (the medium used for recording 
messages) for the next 15 years.199  
Through the introduction of disruptive technologies, smaller companies can 
challenge the market share of larger corporations. As evidenced by the shift from CDs, 
telephones, and postal mail to MP3s, cell phones, and email, disruptive technologies 
enable new companies to absorb the market share from larger established corporations, 
and in some cases, create completely new and independent markets.  
One could argue that this type of competition is a manifestation of Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand theory; requiring these companies to develop disruptive technologies the 
market is working to regulate itself. Because they are often working in unchartered 
territory, companies operating outside of an established industry tend to take a more 
laissez-faire approach to doing business; therefore they have no defined filter for a 
technology to pass through before it is released to the public. Barring any change in 
industry’s passivism toward new disruptive technologies, the first indication of a new 
threat from the illicit appropriation of a technology may be in the form of an attack on 
American soil. This type of threat, one that is widespread and contains a multitude of 
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unknown factors, is precisely why the government has previously explored different 
methods of understanding new technologies when they are still in their infancy.  
A. UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS 
Whether intentional or not, there is a symbiotic relationship between the U.S. 
government and the development of new technologies.200 For example, the government 
“contributes over one-half the nation’s R & D funds.”201 In an attempt to understand new 
technologies and make the right choice with taxpayer’s money, the government has 
formed such groups as the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), and more recently, 
the Emerging Technologies Interagency Policy Coordination Committee (ETIPC). While 
full of good intentions and ideas, both of these groups have failed in one form or another 
to provide today’s decision makers with timely and actionable information.  
The OTA was established by Congress through the Technology Assessment Act 
of 1972 “as an aid in the identification and consideration of existing and probable impacts 
of technological applications,” whether beneficial or adverse.202 Proposed by 
Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario, the driving force behind the OTA’s creation was the 
skepticism surrounding the adoption of new technologies that began to proliferate in the 
mid to late 1960s. Congress stated in the act, “it is essential that, to the fullest extent 
possible, the consequences of technological applications be anticipated, understood, and 
considered in determination of public policy on existing and emerging national 
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Space Transportation” (April 1990) and “World Population and Fertility Planning 
Technologies: The Next 20 Years” (February 1982).204 
Due to budgetary constraints and criticisms over its effectiveness its shutdown in 
1995 left Congress without a method for the government to get nonpartisan and objective 
advice and analysis on the potential impact of EDTs, there has been a movement in recent 
years to reopen the office. Perhaps due to the fact that many of the office’s findings are 
still relevant today, Hillary Clinton and others within the current administration have 
advocated for the OTA’s reinstatement.  
More recently, in 2010, the Obama Administration formed the ETIPC. Made up 
of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and assistant-
secretary level members from 20 other federal agencies, it is tasked with accessing, “the 
policy implications of emerging technologies, including the need for ‘risk-benefit-based 
oversight mechanisms that can ensure safety without stifling innovation, stigmatizing 
emerging technologies, or creating trade barriers.’”205 However, as Tucker points out, 
despite this mandate the committee does not have legal authority, requisite experience, or 
even a security mandate to mitigate newly developed threats.206 Instead, it is primarily 
concerned with assisting the development of emerging technologies in the infotech, 
biotech, and nanotech industries.207  
B. FLEXIBILITY VERSUS RIGIDITY 
In the United States, privately funded firms that conduct research and 
development outside of traditional industry norms can do so without any formal 
oversight. While this freedom has enabled the development and diffusion of disruptive 
                                                 
204 Ibid. 
205 Heather Evans, “Emerging Technologies IPC Has Inaugural Meeting,” Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, The White House, last modified May 15, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010 
/05/15/emerging-technologies-ipc-has-inaugural-meeting; Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and Security, 
330–1. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Evans, “Emerging Technologies IPC Has Inaugural Meeting;” Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and 
Security, 330–1. 
 64 
technologies, it has also created an “extreme form of competitive individualism.”208 The 
primary motivation to push a new technology toward ubiquity is competition and profit, 
seemingly ignoring the social costs.209 Even though the introduction of state-of-the-art 
technology enables businesses to stay ahead of their competition; these new innovations 
may also come with unknown safety and security concerns.  
To ensure the safety and security of its population the European Union has chosen 
to adopt a regulatory measured called the “precautionary principle.”210 This principle 
grants policy makers, when there is a “danger associated with a procedure or product 
placed on the market,” the power to require the producers of a technology to “prove the 
absence of danger” associated with their product.211 While there is a movement within 
the U.S. to introduce a similar type of regulatory control, advocates against its 
implementation argue that a “better safe than sorry” approach to technological innovation 
does not align with American ideals.212 By its nature, any type of innovation exploration 
is going to be inherently risky, and allowing policy makers the power to directly stifle 
technological progress based on “salutary political or moral motivations” would only 
intensify the nation’s rigid regulatory environment. Due to the government’s liner 
framework (i.e., the current process of creation, distribution, and then enforcement of 
rules and regulations), it is unable to efficiently and expeditiously adjust rules and 
regulations to reflect market or social changes.213  
A contemporary example of how lack of regulatory flexibility can impede the use 
of new technology is the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) ban on commercial 
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drone usage.214 As the cost and complexity of commercial drone systems decreased, the 
proliferation of the technology increased. Thus, the door opened for widespread drone 
usage in a multitude of different industries such as journalism, real estate, videography, 
etc., none of which have experience with the rules and regulations associated with 
operating an air vehicle within U.S. airspace. Even though the widespread public and 
private interest in commercial drone usage began around 2010, the FAA failed to prepare 
a set of rules and regulations that specifically address the operation of drones within U.S. 
airspace.215 Because of this lack of foresight and driven by security concerns, the FAA 
chose to issue a blanket policy banning the use of drones (except for those granted an 
exemption, which is decided on a case-by-case basis) until it formulated a set of rules and 
regulations that governed their use. Congress has called for them to complete this by 
September 2015. The inability of the FAA to expedite necessary regulatory controls over 
commercial drone usage could inhibit or stall the further development and usage of this 
new technology—which is an example of the “hidden cost” of government regulation.216 
The complexities involved with introducing oversight measures into the 
development, diffusion, and adoption of EDTs, are very similar to those faced in the 
biotechnology field. Advances in biotechnology are plagued with dual-use concerns, and 
the efforts to prevent the illicit use and potential appropriation of new breakthroughs risk 
inadvertently inhibiting the innovation’s development, diffusion, and adoption. In order 
to address this concern the biotechnology field has begun to shift toward a flexible 
governance model because its innovations, “are advancing so fast that more rigid 
measures would rapidly become obsolete.”217 As described by Lori Knowles, the three 
types of oversight used in biotechnology are “hard law (treaties, statutes, and 
regulations), soft law (voluntary standards and guidelines), and informal measures 
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(awareness raising, professional codes of conduct).”218 When used together these 
mechanisms can form a blanket of protection against illicit use and appropriation by 
ensuring responsible usage. Even though the government cannot institute an all-
encompassing approach to protect the public against the illicit use and appropriation of 
all EDTs, it can assist in the establishment of an oversight framework that allows for 
rapid and frequent changes.219 It is now possible “for governance systems to develop 
simultaneously with technologies, permitting proactive rather than reactive management 
structures.”220  
Two types of flexible regulation methods form alternatives to the typical 
command-and-control design (traditional or direct regulation where the government 
regulates industry): “adhocracies” and “ambidextrous organizations.” The benefit of an 
adhocracy is that it provides a dynamic operating environment that is free from 
bureaucracy.221 A well-known successful example is the DARPA. Ambidextrous 
organizations are those that are designed to focus on both short- and long-term goals 
simultaneously.222 Eastman Kodak is a good example of a company that would have 
benefited from a more ambidextrous design because its structure was, “so captivated by 
its past that it was too slow in changing along with its environment,” which ultimately 
lead to its downfall.223  
Richard Stewart lists four different ways that regulation could stifle innovation in 
his paper on “Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law.” They are, “(1) by 
imposing technical constraints on firms; (2) by forcing firms to make additional 
                                                 
218 Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and Security, 45. 
219 Marchant, Abbott, and Allenby, Innovative Governance Models, 256. 
220 Tucker, Innovation, Dual Use, and Security, 45; Marchant. Abbott, and Allenby, Innovative 
Governance Models, 62. 
221 Robert Waterman, Adhocracy: The Power to Change (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992). 
222 Tushman, Winning Through Innovation; Robert Duncan, “The Ambidextrous Organization: 
Designing Dual Structures for Innovation,” in The Management of Organization Design, Vol. 1. Strategies 
and Implementation, ed. Ralph Kilmann, Louis Pondy, and Dennis Slevin (New York: North Holland, 
1976), 167–188. 
223 Josh Kerbel, “The U.S. Intelligence Community’s Kodak Moment,” The National Interest, May 
15, 2014, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-intelligence-communitys-kodak.  
 67 
expenditures or outlays; (3) by causing uncertainty; and (4) by causing delay.”224 Similar 
to the compliance burdens that described by Luke Stewart, these concerns ultimately 
“divert time and money from innovative activities to compliance efforts” inhibiting the 
fluid nature of the innovation process.225 Through embracing flexible regulatory 
frameworks, along with an in-depth “data gathering and evaluation” process, it is possible 
for regulation to mature alongside a new technology and break free from the historically 
rigid U.S. regulatory structure.226 However, in order for this type of regulatory design to 
be effective with EDTs, it “must be implemented in a political environment in which 
various stakeholders and interest groups will have their say.”227  
C. APPROPRIATING A REGULATORY DESIGN 
The purpose of pursuing alternative regulatory methodologies is not to remove the 
government from the process. Rather it is to ensure that the government delegates 
regulatory authority to those that are informed and capable of making intelligent 
decisions about EDTs.228 Through the appropriation of the cooperative regulation design 
of the securities market, it is possible to construct an effective and efficient regulatory 
governance for EDTs.229 Cooperative regulation allows for advisory committees to be 
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self-regulation. It differs from co-regulation because the government’s involvement (in 
cooperative regulation) remains mostly passive until advisory committee requires its 
authority.230  
Specifically for EDTs, the cooperative regulation would include an emerging 
technologies advisory committee (eTAC) that would be backed by the DHS S&T 
Directorate. Additionally, the committee, DHS, and inventors would benefit from the 
inclusion of independent and objective technological savvy research, perhaps an 
emerging technologies assessment board (eTAB) modeled after the OTA. Finally, 
“because of limitations of budget, personnel, time, and working experience, regulators 
cannot hope to develop in-house all the information and specialized experience needed to 
make effective regulatory judgments.”231 Therefore, eTAC must allow inventors an 
opportunity to provide feedback during the evaluation process.232 
Functionally, eTAC would use its understanding of the hype cycle, technology 
adoption cycle, and the chasm to develop preliminary reports on the EDTs it considers 
candidates for illicit appropriation. Copies of these reports would then be provided to the 
targeted technology’s inventor for comment. A finalized version of the preliminary report 
that incorporates the inventor’s feedback would then be sent to eTAB. The board would 
then conduct in-depth research into the technology and provide the eTAC with a report 
that details the development and functionality of the technology along with any current 
safeguards. In order for this regulatory design to function properly, it is imperative that 
the reports provided by eTAB only contain factual data. eTAC’s responsibility would be 
to conduct a final evaluation based on the eTAB’s research, and then allow the inventor 
another opportunity to provide feedback on the finalized report. Lastly, the report with 
the inventor’s comments would be forwarded to the DHS S&T directorate (perhaps the 
S&T Special Programs Division-Emerging Threats Branch). 
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The intention of this governmental design—cooperative regulation—is to harness 
the benefits inherent in “governance by assessment.”233 Regulation that is “made-to-order 
to satisfy government demands” would be ineffective toward mitigating threats from 
EDTs.234 Furthermore, because cooperative regulation is based off a modified self-
regulatory model, it should prove to be “less costly than traditional command and control 
regulation,” and better suited “to the rapid changes of technology in the innovation 
age.”235 By using an existing governmental body in a supporting role, the DHS S&T 
Directorate, it would ensure that the government’s involvement is kept to a minimum and 
prevent the establishment of an entirely new agency dedicated specifically to mitigating 
threats from EDTs.  
Additionally, instituting only a technical advisory committee (that is, forming a 
body without a research branch) could cause the group to focus primarily on the 
technology rather than the new capability it introduces.236 Instead, this governance model 
would not only provide an in-depth understanding of a new technology, but also a body 
of experience to evaluate safety and security concerns alongside the inventor. The 
involvement of private industry in the evaluative process, along with encouraging them to 
provide feedback on the preliminary and finalized reports, serves a dual purpose. It not 
only builds trust between industry and the regulatory process, but it also is a necessary 
requirement of any method that attempts to mitigate threats from EDTs.237 As Stewart 
illustrates, “with the support and cooperation of all interested parties, these institutes 
could advance relevant technical learning through a nonadversary process, saving 
resources and time and promoting confidence in the technical basis of regulatory 
policy.”238  
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Ultimately, for eTAC to be truly effective the committee must be an independent 
multi-industry backed organization supported by both public and private funding. Similar 
to the manner in which the FDA is funded, eTAC could benefit from fees paid by 
inventors to expedite the committee’s evaluation process. Another potential source of 
funding could come from what Toffler calls a “technological insurance pool.” 
Corporations conducting R&D into new technologies would have to pay liability 
premiums so that “society would not need to wait for a disaster before dealing with its 
technology-induced problems” (at least the financial related aspect of it).239 The concept 
of a liability insurance pool would be a proactive approach to the threats that may stem 
from EDTs, and it would indirectly encourage corporations to be responsible for testing 
their new technology before they begin the diffusion process. In agreement with Toffler, 
“if self-policing works, it is preferable to external, political controls.”240  
D. CONCLUSION 
Any EDT risk mitigation decisional framework, in order to not stifle innovation, 
will need to include flexible levels of control. If the adoption or diffusion of an EDT does 
not pose a threat, controls should be sidelined until the situation changes. Furthermore, a 
requirement for adaptive governance must be based on the ideal that technology itself is 
not the threat; rather it is the new capability that the technology provides.241 
The involvement and acceptance of public and private industry with any instituted 
method of EDT threat mitigation is essential, and should be encouraged through the 
development of a cooperative process. This partnership can be formed through the 
creation of an eTAC, with authority that stems from the DHS S&T Directorate, and an 
iterative feedback process for inventors. Finally, the inclusion of an eTAB modeled after 
the OTA would ensure the committee has the requisite knowledge it needs to make 
informed recommendations and assessments. The ultimate goal is a push and pull form of 
education at every level and on both sides of the innovation development, diffusion, and 
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adoption processes. Innovators need to be educated on potential types and methods of 
illicit appropriation, and the oversight process needs to include individuals 
knowledgeable about the innovation process.  
The framework outlined in this chapter is one that is purposely not reliant on a 
traditional bureaucratic laced process; instead it is dependent on individuals working 
together to ensure society can reap the benefits of new technologies without worrying 
about potential revenge effects. As outlined by Wu, independent of the manner of 
regulation, whoever dictates the regulatory process will control innovation within an 
industry (its “master switch”). Despite the tendency to associate the term “regulation” 
with “government,” Wu stipulates how a monopoly can exert the same control as a 
governmental body. Therefore, it is incumbent upon society to institute an effective and 
efficient manner of regulatory control over EDTs in order to prevent any one group from 
inhibiting future innovation development due to being risk adverse.242 
We have taught ourselves to create and combine the most powerful of 
technologies. We have not taken pains to learn about their consequences. 
Today these consequences threaten to destroy us. We must learn, and learn 
fast.243  
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